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New Pennsylvania Bond Laws
A Summary of the Present Status of Contractors' Bonds
Protecting Subcontractors and Materialmen on
Public Work in Pennsylvania
Forty-four states in the Union, as well as the Federal
Government, require contractors on public work to furnish
a bond for the protection of laborers and materialmen.1
There is nothing ultra vires or contrary to public policy in
this requirement. It is the right, as well as the interest,
of the municipality to secure good work upon its contracts
for public improvements and there is no better policy to-
ward that end than to satisfy honest and competent work-
men that they can rely on being paid. There being no
right of mechanics' liens against public works, the laborers
and materialmen are, to that extent, in the contractors'
power as to pay and that fact has a natural tendency to
produce skimped work and inferior materials by the class
of men willing to run that risk. Against this risk the city
is entitled to protect itself by exacting assurance from the
contractor that he will pay his honest debts incurred in
doing the public work: Philadelphia v. Stewart, 195 Pa. 309
(1900); 201 Pa. 526 (1902).
Our Supreme Court has frequently said that "in con-
tracts for the performance of public work the state or its
subdivisions may, as a matter of public policy, by statute
or ordinance require bonds to protect those furnishing
labor and material for such work, and where a bond is
given for public work in pursuance of a statute or ordin-
ance for the protection of laborers and materialmen, those
who come within the protected class may sue the surety on
'The states without express bond legislation protecting labor and
materialmen are: Kentucky, Maine, New York, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Virginia and Vermont. However, as a matter of policy, a
bond protecting labor and materialmen is required by the State
Highway Department in Maine, South Carolina and Virginia.
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the bond :" Greene County v. Southern Surety Co., 292 Pa. 304
(1928).
Existing legislation may be subdivided as follows:
(a) Federal System;
(b) Ohio System;
(c) Additional Bond System;
(d) Miscellaneous.
The Act of Congress, known as the Heard Act (August
13, 1894, as amended February 24, 1905), requires that per-
formance bonds shall contain an additional clause condi-
tioned that the contractor shall promptly make payment to
all persons supplying labor or material for the prosecution
of the work provided for in the contract. If the full
amount of the liability of the surety on such a bond is in-
sufficient to pay the full amount of the claims and de-
mands, then, after paying the full amount due the United
States, the remainder is distributed pro rata among laborers
and materialmen. The principal objection to the Heard Act
and similar statutes is that, in event suit is not instituted
by the obligee, laborers and materialmen have no right of
action until six months after the completion and final set-
tlement of the public improvement. Consequently, a sub-
contractor must frequently wait a year or more after he
has furnished his last labor or material before he may de-
mand payment from the bonding company.
Naturally, the increased cost to the subcontractor by
reason of such delay is reflected in the amount of his bid,
and, therefore, to some degree, one of the advantages
which should enure to the municipality by the use of such
bonds, namely, the reduction in cost of the public improve-
ment, is partially lost.
The principal statute in Ohio is section 2365 of the
Code. Under this legislation, the bond is required to con-
tain a like additional obligation and to be in an amount
equal to at least 50 per cent. of the contract price. A
person to whom money is due on account of having per-
formed labor or furnished material in the prosecution of
the public improvement, at any time after performing such
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labor or furnishing such material, but not later than ninety
days after the acceptance of the public improvement, is
required to furnish the surety on the bond with a state-
ment of the amount due such claimant. Suit may not be
brought against the surety until after sixty days from the
furnishing of such statement. However, if such indebted-
ness is not paid in full at the expiration of said period of
sixty days, the claimant may bring an action in his own
name upon the bond, which action must be commenced not
later than one year from the date of the acceptance of said
public improvement.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that, where the
penal sum named in the bond is insufficient to cover the
loss sustained by the municipality, the municipality may
recover the full penal sum named in the bond and the per-
sons who furnished labor and material required to con-
struct the public improvement have no right to share in the
fund, since the statute does not expressly give materialmen
priority over the municipality: Cleveland Builders Supply
Co. v. Village of Garfield, 116 Ohio, 339 (1927), 156 N. E. 209.
Thus, the penal sum named in the bond may be exhausted
to the detriment of subcontractors and materialmen. While
the possibility of such a total loss to laborers and material-
men is most remote, nevertheless the illustration just given
furnishes a strong argument in favor of the Pennsylvania,
or additional bond system.
However, until the enactment of the acts passed by
the 1931 session of the legislature, there were so many stat-
utes in Pennsylvania that the rights of parties, if any,
varied with the place where and the time when the addi-
tional bond was taken, the kind of labor and material
furnished, and the form of the bond.
When the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania enterled
into a contract for the improvement of a state highway,
it was the duty of the contractor to furnish a performance
bond containing an additional obligation for the protection
of laborers and materialmen. The Act of Assembly (May
31, 1911, P. L. 468, as amended June 16, 1921) was almost
identical, word for word, to the Heard Act. This federal
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statute is liberally construed by the courts. It has been
held that, while the statute is somewhat ambiguous, the
courts should so construe it as to give full effect to its
obvious purpose, avoid injustice and absurd results:
London, etc., Indemnity Co. v. Smoot, 287 Fed. 952 (1923).
- Under the Heard Act, recovery may be had for oil,
gasoline, etc., used in operating shovels employed in the
work of excavation and for dynamite, explosives, etc., used
in the construction of a public highway. Most states per-
mit recovery for such items. When the issue came before
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, it was held that,
while the amendment of 1921 made the Pennsylvania stat-
ute almost identical to the Heard Act, this amendment did
not relate to or increase the obligations of the surety, but
merely pertained to the procedure which a creditor might
take to enforce a claim under the bond. The court used
the following language: "The decisions under federal stat-
utes or those of other states cited to us by appellant have
no bearing on the meaning of our acts or on the question
of public policy which they involve :" Com. v. Union Indem-
nity Co., 299 Pa. 143 (1930).
Practically every argument which can be maintained
for construing the Negotiable Instruments Act and other
uniform statutes the same way in the various states may
be used to justify a uniform construction of identical words
in any bond legislation. The highest court of Alabama has
held that the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States will be followed and recovery allowed under the
bond for gasoline, oil, etc., furnished to a highway con-
tractor, applying the established doctrine that a legislature,
in enacting a statute of another jurisdiction, enacts it with
its authoritative interpretation: State v. Southern Surety
Co., 221 Ala. 116, 127 So. 806 (1930).
To correct the conditions brought about by the Penn-
sylvania case just quoted and by decisions such as City, to
use, v. Perna; 94 Pa. Superior Ct. 577 (1928), and Cor. v.
Aetna Casualty Co., 101 Pa. Superior Ct. 314 (1931) which
hold that forms into which cement and concrete are
poured, i. e., a false-work, materials which do not remain
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upon the completion of the contract or become a compon-
ent part of the public improvement, are not protected by
the bond legislation, the Highway Act was amended by the
Act of May 7, 1929, P. L. 1590, to provide that the bond
shall be conditioned for the payment for all material fur-
nished or labor performed in the prosecution of the work
contracted for, whether or not the said labor or material
entered into and became component parts of the structure,
work or improvement contemplated. The coverage of the
Act of 1929 was adopted in the 1931 legislation.
In Greene County v. Southern Surety Co., 292 Pa. 304
(1928), the court analyzed the rights of third-party bene-
ficiaries under bonds executed in connection with public
improvements. In that case, Greene County entered into an
agreement for the construction of a state highway route.
The court concluded that, in the absence of legislation re-
quiring a county to obtain a bond for the protection of such
materialmen, a sub-contractor who furnished material
which actually went into the construction of the highway
could not maintain a suit upon the bond taken by the
county, either in his own name or in the name of Greene
County to his use, notwithstanding the express condition
in the bond that the "principal and his surety shall (1)
save harmless the County of Greene from . . . any liability
for the payment of wages due or materials furnished . , .
and shall well and truly pay for all material furnished...
[for] the .. . highway."
By the weight of authority throughout the United
States, materialmen may not sue in their own names on
such a bond. Even though in Montgomery County v. Ambler-
Davis Co., 302 Pa. 333(1931), where the county instituted suit
in its own name for the use of laborers and materialmen
on a substantially similar bond On the theory that the bond
was not only an agreement of indemnity but also an obli-
gation of insurance, a judgment entered for the defendant
on questions of law was sustained, it has been decided in
other states that a municipality may maintain an action in
its name for the benefit of unpaid laborers and material-
men against the surety company on the bond under its ex-
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press obligation to pay or cause to be paid sums due
persons who furnished labor and material required in the
prosecution of a public improvement.
As an aftermath to the Greene County case, the munic-
ipal officers changed the form of bond required by counties
and other municipalities in connection with the highway
work by inserting a clause that the principal and surety
were liable unto the county for the use "of the county and
any other corporation or persons interested" and by adding
a new paragraph to the effect that the principal and surety
agreed with the obligee that, in case of the failure on the
part of either to carry out the provisions of the bond, any
person who furnished labor or material used in and about
the construction of the highway, payment for which had
not been made, had the right to intervene in and be made
a party to an action instituted by the municipality, subject,
however, to the priority of the claim and judgment of the
municipality, and if suit were not brought upon the bond
by the municipality within six months from the completion
of said contract and final settlement thereunder, such
laborers and materialmen had the right to sue on the bond.
Such voluntary bonds have been sustained by our Supreme
Court: Portland Sand and Gravel Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co.,
301 Pa. 132 (1930); Easton School District v. Continental
Casualty Co., 304 Pa. 67 (1931).
Section one of the Act of May 10, 1917, P. L. 158, as
amended May 6, 1925, P. L. 546, made it the duty of all
counties, cities, boroughs, towns, townships, school districts
and poor districts, in the improvement of lands or in the
erection or repair of public buildings, to require of the con-
tractor an additional bond with sufficient surety or sureties
providing for the payment of all labor and material enter-
ing into such improvement. Section two gave laborers and
materialmen the right to sue in an action of assumpsit in
the name of the obligee upon such additional bond upon
proof of the contractor's failure to pay for said labor and
material.
This statute was further amended by the Act of March
28, 1929, P. L. 106, to require the additional bond to be
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taken in the improvement or repair of roads and bridges
and to provide for the payment "of all machinery used on
such improvement." The clause just quoted is vague and
uncertain. It does not indicate whether payment may be
recovered for the rental value of machinery during its
actual use, for all or part of the cost of the machinery, or
for repairs which may be required during the use of the
machinery in connection with the public improvement.
Furthermore, the scope of this amendment was reduced
since the Act of 1925 has been repealed, in so far as bor-
oughs were concerned, by the General Borough Act of
1927, P. L. 519 (although section 1201 of this Code ex-
pressly reenacts the Act of 1925), and by the General
County Act of 1929, P. L. 1278, pertaining to counties of
the second to the eighth class, although section 564 of this
Code is substantially similar to the Act of 1925. Whether
the amendment of March 28, 1929, P. L. 106, was carried
into the County Code of 1929 by section 1052 thereof is
now in litigation.
The only county in this state which is a county of the
first class is Philadelphia County. In this county, laborers
and materialmen were protected by the Ordinance of Jan-
uary 15, 1925, now the Ordinance of July 10, 1930, page
352. By this ordinance, persons entering into a contract
with the City of Philadelphia are required to furnish an
additional bond for the protection of laborers and material-
men. However, the ordinance provides that no suit shall
be brought upon the bond unless written notice of the de-
livery of the material or the performance of the work has
been given to the principal contractor within ninety days
from the performance of the last of said work or the de-
livery of the last of the material for which suit is brought,
but contains the qualification that this requirement has no
application where such work or materials were furnished
under a contract, express or implied, between the claimant
and persons who entered into the contract with the City
of Philadelphia. No suit may be brought upon this bond
after the expiration of one year from the date on which
the last of the materials were furnished and labor per-
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formed for which claim was made.
A person who furnishes labor and material required in
the construction or repair of a school edifice in Philadel-
phia County may sue on the additional bond only if he has
complied with Rule XIX of the Board of Public Educa-
tion, which provides that, before instituting suit, claimant
must furnish proof satisfactory to the Secretary of the
Board of Education that written notice of the delivery of
the material or the labor performed has been given to the
principal or surety within ninety days. Bonds taken by
this school district contain the limitation that no suit shall
be brought upon the same after the expiration of two
years from date.
Reasonable limitations restricting the time for suit or
requiring notice, contained in the additional bond, not in-
consistent with existing legislation, have been held bind-
ing upon persons who seek to claim the benefit of the
bond: Scranton School District v. Casualty and Surety Co., 98
Pa. Superior Ct. 599 (1930).
After considerable study of the legislation and deci-
sions throughout the United States, and after many con-
ferences with materialmen, contractors, representatives of
surety companies and other parties in interest, there were
introduced in the legislature a number of bills designed to
make uniform and clarify the law in this state. This legis-
lation retains the sound principle of an additional bond.
Hence, the rights of the materialmen and the municipality
are independent. The penal sum named in the additional
bond is sufficient to afford adequate protection in all normal
cases, and, since the rights of the municipality are pre-
served under the primary or performance bond, material-
men need not fear that the penal sum named in the addi-
tional bond will be consumed by prior claims.
Since the laws with reference to most subdivisions in
this state have been assembled in codes, instead of in a
single act for the Commonwealth and all political subdivi-
sions thereof, it was necessary to introduce a number of
bills, each making it the duty of the municipality under
consideration to require any person, copartnership, associa-
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tion or corporation entering into a contract with such
municipality for the construction, erection, installation,
completion, alteration, repair of or addition to any public
work or improvement of any kind whatsoever, where the
amount of such contract is in excess of $500, 2 before com-
mtencing work under such contract, to execute and deliver
to such municipality, in addition to any other bond which
may be required by law to be given with such contract, an
additional bond for the use of any and every person, co-
partnership, association or corporation interested in a sum
not less than 50 per cent. and not more than 100 per cent.
of the contract price, the surety thereon to be one or more
surety companies, legally authorized to do business in this
Commonwealth, conditioned for the prompt payment of all
material furnished and labor supplied or performed in the
prosecution of the work, whether or not the said material
and labor enter into and become component parts of the
work or improvement contemplated.
It is believed that since these acts have become the
law persons furnishing oil, coal, explosives or false-work
of any kind used in connection with the public improve-
ment and required by the plans and specifications will have
the right to sue on the additional bond and that the protec-
tion under the additional bond will not be limited to labor
and -material which become a component part of the com-
pleted structure: Com. v. Aetna Casualty Co., 101 Pa.
Superior Ct. 314 (1931). -Such a coverage is reasonable and
2The Administrative Code requires a bidder to whom a con-
tract for the construction or repair of a public building has been
awarded to substitute for the certified or bank check which ac-
companied his proposal, within ten days after such award, an addi-
tional bond of the kind just referred to: Act of April 9, 1929, P. L.
177, section 2408 (h), as amended by Act No. 144, approved June 1,
1931.
Section 508 of the Administrative Code of 1929 provides that
no administrative department except the Department of Property
and Supplies and no administrative board or commission, except as
in said act specifically otherwise provided, shall contract for the
erection or construction of any new building or contract for making
any alteration or addition to any existing building involving an ex-
penditure of more than $10,000.
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logical and is supported by the weight of authority
throughout the United States.
It will be noted that the primary bond with the addi-
tional clause is no longer required in connection with state
highway work, but that, by the 1931 amendment to the
Highway Act (Act No. 353), an additional bond with the
broad coverage of the 1929 amendment must be taken.
While the premium on surety bonds is based upon the
contract price, and, hence, is the same whether the addi-
tional bond is for 50 per cent. or 100 per cent. of the con-
tract price, the legislature has left the amount of the bond
to the discretion of the municipal officers, subject to the
lirmfitations above quoted.
The new statutes further require that the additional
bond be deposited with and held by the obligee for the use
of any party interested therein and that every such addi-
tional bond shall provide that every person, co-partner-
ship, association or corporation who, whether as subcon-
tractor or otherwise, has furnished material or supplied or
performed labor in the prosecution of the work and who
has not been paid therefor may sue in assumpsit on said
additional bond in the name of the municipality for his,
their or its use and benefit, prosecute the same to final
judgm'ent for such sum or sums as may be due him, them
or it, and have execution thereon, provided, however, that
the municipality shall not be liable for the payment of any
costs or expense of any such suit.
This legislation reenacts the existing law that the
right of recovery is not restricted to subcontractors:
Merion School District v. Evans, 295 Pa. 280 (1929); Eddy-
stone School District v. Lewis, 98 Pa. Superior Ct. 227 (1929).
However, the general contractor and the surety now have
reasonable protection against double payment by the re-
quirement of notice inserted in Act No. 294. This act by
section one, defines the word "municipality" as used there-
in to mean and include counties, cities, boroughs, incorp-
orated towns, townships, school districts, poor districts or
any other incorporated district, and, by section two, pro-
vides that, whenever the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
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acting by or through any department or agency thereof or
any municipality therein, shall require any person, copart-
nership, association or corporation entering into a contract
with such department, agency or municipality to execute
and deliver an additional bond conditioned for the payment
of material furnished and labor supplied or performed in
the prosecution of any public work or improvement, then,
in such event, every person, copartnership, association or
corporation who, whether as subcontractor or otherwise,
has furnished material or supplied or performed labor in
the prosecution of such public work or improvement,
whether or not the said material or labor enter into and
become component parts of the work or improvement con-
templated, and who has not been paid therefor, shall have
the right to sue in assumpsit on said additional bond in the
name of the Commonwealth where the said contract has
been entered into with any department or agency thereof,
and in the name of the municipality where the said con-
tract has been entered into with such municipality, for his,
their or its use, to prosecute the same to final judgment
for such sum or sums as may be justly due him, them or it,
and to have execution thereon, provided, however, that
such department, agency or municipality shall not be liable
for the payment of any costs or expense of any suit.
Section three reads: "No such suit shall be commenced
prior to ninety days from the date upon which the said
person, copartnership, association or corporation furnished,
supplied or performed the last of the material or labor for
which said claim was made, and such suit shall be com-
menced not later than one year from the date of final set-
tlement under said contract with the Commonwealth act-
ing by or through its said department or agency or with
the municipality."
It will be observed that this section meets the objec-
tion to the federal statute and to the old state highway
law. Materialmen in this state will no longer be required
to defer their demands for payment until six months after
the acceptance of the public improvement. The words
"final settlement" have been construed by the Supreme
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Court of the United States to relate to the time when the
amount due the contractor is determined by the proper
governmental administrative agency, irrespective of the
time when final payment is actually made to the con-
tractor: Illinois Surety Co. v. United States, 240 U. S. 214
(1916). It is sincerely hoped that this interpretation, fol-
lowed by the appellate courts in every state where the
issue has arisen, will receive the same construction by our
appellate courts.
Section four is as follows: "Any such person, co-
partnership, association or corporation who has no con-
tractual relationship, express or implied, with the con-
tractor furnishing the said additional bond shall not have
a right of action upon said additional bond unless the said
person, copartnership, association or corporation shall have
given written notice to said contractor or to his, their or
its surety not later than ninety days from the date on
which the said person, copartnership, association or corp-
oration furnished, supplied or performed the last of the
material or labor for which the said claim is made, stating
with substantial accuracy the amount claimed and the
name of the party with whom the said person, copartner-
ship, association or corporation contracted. Said notice
shall be served either in the manner now or hereafter pro-
vided by law for the service of a summons, save that ser-
vice need not be made by the sheriff, or by mailing said
notice by registered mail postage prepaid in an envelope
addressed to the contractor at the contractor's last known
place of business or residence or to the surety at any of its
offices or places of business."
It will be observed that this provision is substantially
similar to the Philadelphia ordinance. Thus, no notice is
required for materials furnished to the principal contractor:
City of Philadelphia v. Keenan, 100 Pa. Superior Ct. 257
(1930).
Section five of this procedure act is as follows: "Every
person, copartnership, association or corporation, upon
application to such department, agency or municipality
stating that the applicant has furnished, supplied or per-
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formed material or labor in the prosecution of the work
as above provided and that payment has not been made
therefor, shall be promptly furnished at the cost of the
applicant with a certified copy of the said additional bond
and contract. A copy of said additional bond or contract,
certified as aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of the
contents and due execution and delivery of the original."
The sentence making such a certified copy of the bond
and contract prima facie evidence of the contents and due
execution and delivery of the original wag taken from the
Georgia Code of 1926, section 389 (4), Missouri Revised
Statutes of 1919, chapter 8, section 1041, and Nevada Act of
March 26, 1913, chapter 407, section 2: Southern Surety Co.
v. Dawes, 161 Ga. 207, 130 S. E. 577 (1925).
The additional bond statutes approved by the Gov-
ernor are the following:
Act No. Pertaining to
130 School Code.
144 Administrative Code.
145 Boroughs.
146 Counties of the second to the eighth class.
293 Counties of the first class, cities, incorpo-
rated towns and poor districts.
294 Procedure.
331 Townships, first class.
353 State Highway Act.
The Governor vetoed the code pertaining to townships
of the second class (House Bill No. 670, Senate Bill No.
487, Veto No. 172). This veto was brought about by
amendments inserted at the last moment having no con-
nection with the proposed bond legislation, which bond
legislation, of course, met with the Governor's approval.
Under these circumstances, the law making it the duty of
township officials to take the bond is the Act of 1917, as
amended March 28, 1929, P. L. 106. Nevertheless, the town-
ship officials have the authority to exact the broader form
of bond now required to be taken by the state and all
municipal divisions thereof, other than townships of the
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second class: Eastern School District v. Continental Casualty
Co., 304 Pa. 67 (1931); Portland Cement and Gravel Co. v.
Globe Indemnity Co., 301 Pa. 132 (1930).
As a matter of fact, such a bond could be required by
the township officials even in the absence of any legislation
on the subject, so long as there is no statute expressly pro-
hibiting such action: Com. v. Empire State Surety Co., 50
Pa. Superior Ct. 404, 407 (1912); Diamond Match Co. v.
United States, 31 Fed. 271 (1887).
To obtain the desired uniformity, it is hoped that the
public officials throughout the state will adopt, whenever
possible, the same form of bond.
Foot note 3 contains a suggested form of bond pre-
pared after a careful study of the forms adopted for use
by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Of course, the
form of bond used by the Department of Property and
SAdditional bond for labor and material.
Know All Men by These Presents That we, the undersigned,
hereinafter called the "principal,"
and a corporation organized and
existing under -the laws of the state of , having
its principal office at hereinafter called the
"surety," are held and firmly bound unto (municipality) for the use
of any and every person, copartnership, association or corporation
interested in the full and just sum of Dollars
($ ), lawful money of the United States of America, to be
paid to the said obligees or its or their assigns, to which payment
well and truly to be made we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors,
administrators, successors and assigns jointly and severally firmly
by these presents.
Sealed with our respective seals and dated this __ day of
, A. D. 19-.-
Whereas, the above bounden principal has entered into a con-
tract with (municipality) dated the -_ day of , A. D.
19 ____, for the (state work) at (state place),
Now, therefore, the condition of this obligation is such that, if
the above bounden principal shall and will promptly pay or cause to
be paid all sums of money which may be due any person, copart-
nership, association or corporation for all material furnished and
labor supplied or performed in the prosecution of the work, whether
or not the said material or labor enter into and become component
parts of the work or improvement contemplated, then this obliga-
tion to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect.
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Supplies pertains to buildings, whereas the form used by
the Highway Department pertains only to public work of
the kind under its jurisdiction.
Act No. 321, approved June 23, 1931, removes the only
reasonable objection to the additional bond legislation. The
point was raised that since, in a number of states, the con-
tractor is required to furnish one bond which is not only a
performance bond but which contains, as an additional
obligation, the requirement that just claims of labor and
materialmen be promptly paid, many officials in Pennsyl-
vania would continue to take such a bond in ignorance of
the decisions that laborers and materialmen may not sue in
their own names on such a bond. While these principles
of law have become well known in recent years, neverthe-
less, Act No. 321 provides that where but one such bond is
taken, irrespective of whether such bond or any provision
therein shall have been required by statute, ordinance or
The principal and surety further jointly and severally agree with
the obligee herein that every person, copartnership, association or
corporation who, whether as subcontractor or otherwise, has furn-
ished material or supplied or performed labor in the prosecution of
the work as above provided and who has not been paid therefor may
sue in assumpsit on this bond in the name of (municipality) for his,
their or its use, prosecute the same to final judgment for such sums
as may be justly due him, them or it, and have execution thereon,
provided, however, that (municipality) shall not be liable for the
payment of any costs or expense of any such suit.
Recovery by any person, copartnership, association or corpora-
tion hereunder shall be subject to the provisions of the Act of the
General Assembly No. 294, approved June 22, 1931, to the same ex-
tent as if said provisions were fully incorporated in this bond.
It is further agreed that any alterations which may be made in
the terms of the contract or in the work to be done or materials to
be furnished or labor to be supplied or performed under it or the
giving by (municipality) of any extension of time for the perform-
ance of the contract or any other forbearance on the part of either
(municipality) or the principal to the other, shall not in any way
release the principal and the surety or sureties or either or any of
them, their heirs, executors, administrators, successors or assigns,
from their liability hereunder, notice to the surety or sureties of any
such alteration, extension or forbearance being hereby waived.
In Witness Whereof the said principal and surety have duly
executed this bond under seal the day and year first above written.
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any other authority and where no separate or additional bond
conditioned for the payment of material furnished or labor
supplied or performed in connection with such public work has
been taken, then, and in such event, every person who,
whether as subcontractor or otherwise, has furnished
material or supplied or performed labor in connection with
such public work or improvement and who has not been
paid therefor shall have the right to sue on, and to inter-
vene in a suit on, such bond, subject, however, to the pri-
ority of the claim and judgment of the Commonwealth or
municipal obligee, if any.
The provisions of this act are substantially similar to
the Heard Act and the old State Highway Act. However,
it provides that where the principal contractor shall have
for any reason failed to complete performance of his con-
tract and completion of the project is undertaken by the
Commonwealth, the municipality or the surety, either by
themselves or by letting of new contracts, the six-month
period must expire before suit may be brought and the
one-year period within which such action must be brought
by subcontractors, materialmen and laborers shall date
from the completion and acceptance of the project covered
by the original contract and bond. For the purpose of such
suits, the date of such completion shall be fixed by the
officers of the Commonwealth or the municipality. Writ-
ten notice of the date of such completion is required to be
given to all persons who shall theretofore request such
notice.
Section two of this statute is as follows: "Whenever
heretofore a contractor in connection with any public work
or improvement and his, their or its surety has assumed
in a bond given to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania the
obligation to pay all lawful claims of subcontractors,
materialmen and laborers for labor performed and mater-
ials furnished in connection with such public work or im-
provement, then, in such event, the remedies as provided
by section one of this act shall extend to every such sub-
contractor, materialman and laborer."
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As litigation will be instituted in the near future to
determine the rights of persons who furnished labor or
material used in the construction of buildings erected for
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under a bond which
contains the condition referred to in this section, the writer
will not comment upon the issues involved, other than to
point out that Act No. 321 requires the litigation to be con-
solidated in a single suit.
The constructive legislation just reviewed is being
considered in a number of other states, and it is hoped
that, in due course, the Pennsylvania system will be adopt-
ed as the basis of a uniform bond law for the entire United
States.
Philadelphia, Pa. EDWARD H. CUSHMAN
